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* © Edward B. Foley. Director, Election Law @ Moritz, and Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer Professor 
for the Administration of Justice and the Rule of Law, Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State 
University. This Essay is an edited version of the keynote address delivered on September 14, 2012, 
for the symposium, “Foxes, Henhouses, and Commissions: Assessing the Nonpartisan Model in 
Election Administration, Redistricting, and Campaign Finance,” at the University of California, Irvine 
School of Law. In preparing it for publication, I have endeavored to keep it true to its delivery as an 
address, while providing in the footnotes citations and supplementary information that will permit it 
to advance scholarly inquiry on the topics it touches. Its discussion of Samuel Randall’s role in 
resolving the disputed Hayes-Tilden election, far from intending to be the last word on this much-
neglected aspect of our nation’s most momentous electoral crisis, instead will serve a useful purpose if 
it prompts renewed consideration of Randall’s significance as Speaker of the House at the point the 
dispute reached its most critical juncture. The middle portion of this keynote, which is the part that 
focuses on Randall, draws from an earlier talk given at Ohio State on January 24, 2012, entitled 
March 1, 1877: The Stormiest Session of Congress—and Its Relevance Today. In preparing that talk, as well as 
this keynote, I want to thank Les Benedict, John Fortier, Daphne Meimaridis, David Stebenne, 
Charles Stewart, and especially Steve Huefner. Heather Gerken, as the respondent to this address, as 
well as other symposium participants, provided very valuable feedback that I have endeavored to 
incorporate in this edited version. Librarians Matt Cooper, Kathy Hall, and Matt Steinke were 
invaluable in finding original documents. Research assistants Kyle Kopko, Mandy Mallott, and Owen 
Wolfe contributed immensely to this project. I also thank the editors and staff of the UC Irvine Law 
Review, who, in addition to providing excellent and precise editing of the text and footnotes of this 
piece, took on all the tasks associated with reproducing the pictures that accompanied the address and 
appear here. 
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INTRODUCTION 
You can count me among those who strongly believe that the United States 
needs more nonpartisan institutions for the governance of the electoral process. 
My recent scholarship has focused on the design of nonpartisan tribunals to 
adjudicate vote-counting disputes.1 More broadly, in a new paper entitled The 
Separation of Electoral Powers,2 which is a companion to this address, I employ the 
familiar three-part distinction between legislative, executive, and judicial functions 
to sketch out three distinct institutions to tackle the problem of partisanship in 
election administration. I consider the possibility that a nonpartisan body might 
supersede the traditional power of the regular partisan legislature to enact the laws 
that govern the voting process. Most relevant to my points here, I specifically 
advocate for the adoption of a nonpartisan election director, instead of a partisan 
secretary of state, to administer all the rules and procedures for the casting of 
ballots, including early voting. 
My home state of Ohio continues to be Exhibit A of what happens when 
those rules are in the hands of partisans. In each of the last three presidential 
elections, Ohio’s secretaries of state have been accused of making administrative 
decisions with the goal of favoring the presidential candidate from the same party 
as the secretary of state. In 2004, the Ohio secretary of state was Republican Ken 
Blackwell.3 In 2008, Democrat Jennifer Brunner was tagged with the same kind of 
criticism, even though she came into office thinking she could be above the kind 
of reproach that Blackwell received.4 In 2012, Republican Jon Husted began the 
year thinking that he could escape the fate that Blackwell and Brunner both 
suffered, but instead by September he had become embroiled in a nationally 
prominent controversy over cutbacks in Ohio’s early voting opportunities, to the 
point where his critics called him “secretary of suppression.”5 Justified or not, 
these criticisms could not exist if Ohio’s voting rules were enforced, not by a 
partisan secretary of state, but instead by a nonpartisan election director.6 
 
1. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation: A Fair Tribunal for Disputed 
Presidential Elections, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 471 (2010) (examining the idea of impartial 
tribunals through a simulation that used retired judges to stand in for the Supreme Court in a 
hypothetical case with facts similar to Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100–04 (2000)). 
2. Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 MONT. L. REV. 139 (2013). 
3. STEVEN F. HUEFNER, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & EDWARD B. FOLEY WITH NATHAN A. 
CEMENSKA, FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS: THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE 
MIDWESTERN STATES 27–28 (2007). 
4. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT 
ELECTION MELTDOWN 19, 24–25 (2012). 
5. E.g., Ari Berman, Eleventh-Hour GOP Voter Suppression Could Swing Ohio, NATION (Nov. 4, 
2012, 9:35 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/171011/eleventh-hour-gop-voter-suppression-could 
-swing-ohio. 
6. My own assessment of Secretary Husted’s performance is that much of the criticism leveled 
against him was unwarranted and that he arguably did a better job than either of his two immediate 
predecessors in making administrative decisions based on a nonpartisan conception of the public 
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Based on my observations of the electoral process in Ohio, as well as many 
other states, if there were a National Association for the Advancement of 
Nonpartisan Electoral Institutions, I would proudly be a card-carrying member. 
I. THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONALISM 
Still, what I want to say here is that nonpartisan institutions are not enough. 
We also need individual officeholders in those institutions who have sufficient 
virtue that they do not make their decisions based on favoritism for a particular 
party or candidate. 
A. The Need for Virtuous Officeholders 
Let me illustrate this point with a hypothetical. Suppose we become lucky 
enough to have a federal director of elections, appointed by the most nonpartisan 
method we can devise. I have in mind something like Rick Hasen’s proposal that a 
presidential appointment require confirmation by three-quarters of the Senate.7 It 
still would be necessary that the individual who holds this office actually act in a 
nonpartisan manner. 
To invoke an analogy: Just as it would be wrong for the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve to make decisions about monetary policy based on a desire to 
help a particular presidential candidate win in November,8 so too it would be 
wrong for a federal director of elections to make decisions about the availability of 
early voting based on favoritism for a particular presidential candidate. We hope 
 
interest. For example, his decision not to appeal the federal court ruling that required the counting of 
so-called “right church, wrong pew” ballots was consistent with a desire to run a fair election rather 
than seek maximum partisan advantage—and in making this decision, Husted parted company with 
his fellow partisan, Attorney General Mike DeWine, who insisted on pursuing the appeal. Even so, 
Husted’s record was far from perfect. As I wrote at the time, his decision not to permit any weekend 
early voting in October was one that only a partisan Republican would reach; it would not have been 
adopted by a nonpartisan election director. See Edward B. Foley, Analyzing a Voting War Trifecta, FREE 
& FAIR (Aug. 16, 2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/freefair/index.php?ID=9579. 
Moreover, if a nonpartisan election director had made the decision to eliminate the last weekend of 
early voting (on the ground that local election officials needed that time to prepare for Election Day), 
that decision would not have been susceptible to the same kind of intense criticism as was the 
substantively identical move that was actually made in Ohio. The reason is that Ohio’s actual decision 
was made by a partisan institution that reasonably could be accused of acting out of partisan motives, 
whereas a nonpartisan institution would be immune from the same kind of attack. 
7. Hasen applies this confirmation requirement to a three-member commission, but it is 
equally nonpartisan if applied to a single director of elections. See Richard L. Hasen, End the Voting 
Wars, SLATE (June 13, 2012, 6:09 PM), http://hive.slate.com/hive/how-can-we-fix-constitution/article/ 
end-the-voting-wars. 
8. Coincidentally, on the eve of this keynote address, Republicans accused Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke of making decisions with a view to aid Obama’s reelection efforts. See Peter 
Schroeder & Erik Wasson, Republicans Question Whether Fed Carrying Water for Obama, HILL (Sept. 13, 
2012, 5:00 AM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/249185-republicans-question-whether-fed 
-carrying-water-for-obama. 
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that the structural design of the Federal Reserve,9 and specifically the method by 
which the Fed chair is appointed,10 reduces the risk that the chair is actually 
motivated by partisanship. But we cannot guarantee that we have eliminated this 
risk completely. Likewise, requiring three-fourths of the Senate to confirm a 
federal director of elections would considerably reduce the risk that this director 
would actually be motivated by partisan bias. But even with this optimal 
appointment method, we have not eliminated the risk entirely. 
Let me give you a real-world reminder that sometimes officials who are 
specifically chosen to be nonpartisan when making important electoral decisions 
actually end up acting as if they were affected by partisanship. Consider, in this 
regard, the role of the five Supreme Court justices on the Electoral Commission 
that Congress created to help resolve the disputed Hayes-Tilden presidential 
election of 1876.11 
 











9. The structure of the Federal Reserve system is complex. The Federal Open Markets 
Committee is the institution that sets interest rates; its members are the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors as well as the presidents of the regional Federal Reserve banks. The bank presidents are 
selected through a process that gives power to private-sector financial institutions, while the president 
and Congress appoint the board members to fourteen-year terms. By tradition, as well as design, the 
Fed is expected to be insulated from political pressure when determining monetary policy. See generally 
WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE (1987). 
10. The chairmanship is a four-year term but eligibility is limited to members of the Board of 
Governors who, with their fourteen-year terms, are supposed to be independent of politics. See Board 
Members, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/ 
board/default.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
11. In my judgment, the best single volume on the disputed Hayes-Tilden election remains 
PAUL LELAND HAWORTH, THE HAYES-TILDEN DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876 
(Russell & Russell 1966) (1906), largely because of its thoroughness, but also due to its commendably 
nonpartisan assessment of various actors involved. In reading Haworth today, one cannot avoid 
wincing at its antiquated language, especially in regards to matters of race. The book is a product of 
the same era as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and even if Haworth is as enlightened as Justice 
Harlan’s dissent on issues of race, that standard still falls far short of contemporary norms. For an 
excellent recent account of the Hayes-Tilden dispute, but one that is less comprehensive than 
Haworth’s, see MICHAEL F. HOLT, BY ONE VOTE: THE DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 
1876 (2008). 
Joseph Bradley (R) Nathan Clifford (D) Stephen Field (D) 
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Congress included five justices on the Commission, in addition to five 
senators and five representatives, in the hope and expectation that they as jurists 
would be more impartial than the ten members of Congress on the panel. All five 
of these justices ended up embracing the legal position that benefited the 
candidate of the party with which they were associated; the three Republican 
justices supported the Hayes position, and the two Democratic justices sided with 
Tilden. Most significantly, Justice Joseph Bradley’s alignment with the other 
Republicans on the Commission proved dispositive. Bradley was added to the 
Commission as the fifth justice at the last minute when Justice David Davis, who 
was viewed as an independent, declined to serve. Thus, Bradley was chosen 
specifically to be nonpartisan, and yet he acted in a way that appeared (at least to 
Democrats at the time) to be motivated by party loyalty. There are many lessons 
to draw from Bradley’s appointment to and performance on the Commission, and 
I have written about some of them previously.12 But the one that is most relevant 
here is this: it is not enough to appoint someone to be a nonpartisan tiebreaker, 
whose role is to be the single impartial vote if all the other members split along 
party lines. It is necessary, too, that this designated neutral member of the body 
actually possess the psychological disposition to be neutral and then act according 
to this virtuous disposition rather than from a motive, conscious or not, to favor 
one side or the other.13 
 
12. See Edward B. Foley, Recounts: Elections in Overtime, in ELECTION LAW AND POLITICS: THE 
RULES OF THE GAME 149, 158–60 (Matthew J. Streb ed., Routledge 2013) (2004); Foley, supra note 1, 
at 507; see also Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. Foley, Lost Opportunity: Learning the Wrong Lesson from the 
Hayes-Tilden Dispute, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1043, 1045–50 (2010); Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. 
Foley, The Twelfth Amendment: A Constitutional Ticking Time Bomb, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 502–16 
(2010) [hereinafter Colvin & Foley, The Twelfth Amendment]. 
13. I do not mean to suggest that Justice Bradley in fact was motivated by partisanship rather 
than a sincere belief that ruling in favor of Hayes was the correct constitutional position. My own 
assessment of the key legal question before the Commission—whether the Constitution’s 
requirement that the presidential electors in all states cast their Electoral College votes on the same 
date, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4, means that any recount completed after that date of ballots cast 
by citizens for the office of presidential electors must be null and void—is that this question was 
Samuel Miller (R) William Strong (R)
480 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:475 
 
Put more succinctly, in order to have genuine electoral nonpartisanship in 
practice, it is necessary to have virtuous officeholders in addition to well-designed 
institutions. 
B. The Problem of Partisan Legislatures 
There is more to this necessity of virtue. We must consider, too, the role of 
the legislature in the governance of the electoral process. The legislature enacts the 
voting laws. If these voting laws are partisan in their motivation, the inherent bias 
of these laws is not negated just because they are administered by a nonpartisan 
director of elections instead of a partisan secretary of state. We all know about the 
recent enactment of restrictive voting laws by Republican-dominated state 
legislatures. Many observers suspect that these laws were motivated by a desire to 
secure a partisan advantage, rather than a sincere policy preference.14 This 
suspicion, of course, was validated, at least in Pennsylvania, when the Republican 
leader of the state’s house of representatives, Mike Turzai, gloated to fellow 
partisans that passage of that state’s new voter ID law would secure Mitt 
Romney’s victory in the state.15 This example vividly shows that, to remove 
inappropriate partisanship from the governance of the voting process, it is hardly 
enough to put in place a nonpartisan official to administer the voting laws that the 
legislature enacts. 
Yet the legislature is going to remain a thoroughly partisan institution. It is 
not going to be reformed to become some sort of nonpartisan body. Nor is the 
authority to enact laws for the governance of the voting process likely to be 
completely removed from the purview of partisan legislatures. To be sure, we may 
be able to remove redistricting from the legislature’s authority, as California did.16 
If we are especially fortunate, we might be able to assign the authority to 
promulgate many election administration rules—including voter ID rules—to 
some form of independent nonpartisan body.17 And we may be able to use 
 
reasonably open to opposite answers, but that Bradley’s was the better view. Nonetheless, Bradley 
siding with his fellow Republicans, in opposition to all the Democrats on the Commission, left the 
impression (also reasonable) that he acted as a partisan. We can never be sure of Bradley’s actual 
motives, and they may have been complicated enough that he did not completely know his own mind. 
It would have been better to have a genuine neutral in the tiebreaking role, and for that neutral to act 
genuinely based on an impartial frame of mind. 
14. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of 
Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865 (2013). 
15. Here’s the direct quote: “‘Voter ID, which is gonna allow Governor Romney to win the 
state of Pennsylvania, done.’” Michael Cooper, Pennsylvania’s Voter ID Law Spurs Debate, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2012, at A11 (quoting Turzai). 
16. See Bruce Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808 (2012); 
Justin Levitt, Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513 (2011); Karin 
Mac Donald, Adventures in Redistricting: A Look at the California Redistricting Commission, 11 ELECTION 
L.J. 472 (2012). 
17. Wisconsin is the leading example in this country of a state with a nonpartisan commission 
for the administration of voting rules. Daniel P. Tokaji, America’s Top Model: The Wisconsin Government 
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constitutional law to protect against the most egregious instances of partisan 
favoritism in the enactment of voting laws by a legislature (although in the 
Pennsylvania voter ID lawsuit the trial court refused to invalidate the law on that 
basis18). In any event, we are unlikely to entirely eliminate the authority of partisan 
legislatures to enact laws for the governance of the electoral process. 
Therefore, if the electoral process is to be protected from legislation 
motivated by partisan favoritism, this protection will need to come in part from 
the willingness of legislative leaders to be virtuous and to set aside such partisan 
motives. 
Lest you think it inconceivable that a legislative leader is capable of putting 
aside partisanship when a major election is at stake, I want to give you an actual 
example. In fact, I want to share with you what may well be the most significant 
act of nonpartisan virtue on the part of an elected politician in U.S. history, 
involving perhaps the most explosive session ever in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Yet I suspect many of you, as well as most Americans alive today, 
have never heard of this individual or his particular act of nonpartisan virtue. 
II. SAMUEL RANDALL ON MARCH 1, 1877: A PROFILE IN ELECTORAL COURAGE 
The politician is Samuel Randall, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, who was 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives at the time of the disputed Hayes-
Tilden election.19 The episode in question occurred on March 1, 1877, three days 
 
Accountability Board, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 575 (2013). But, as Dan Tokaji shows, even Wisconsin is a 
cautionary tale in this regard, as its Government Accountability Board (GAB) is subservient to the 
state’s legislature, which on partisan grounds has overridden the GAB’s nonpartisan judgment on the 
topic of voter ID. In my essay on The Separation of Electoral Powers, I explore the theoretical limits to 
the idea that partisan legislation in the field of election law might be replaced by a nonpartisan 
assembly with exclusive authority to enact a state’s election laws. See Foley, supra note 2. 
18. The Pennsylvania trial court, on remand from the state’s supreme court, temporarily 
enjoined enforcement of the voter ID law for the 2012 election, relying on the grounds that it would 
cause the disenfranchisement of some eligible voters. See Applewhite v. Pennsylvania., No. 330 M.D. 
2012 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (supplemental determination on application of preliminary 
injunction), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Opinion_004.pdf. 
But the court intimated that the law would be permitted to take effect for future elections and did not 
suggest that it would be invalidated solely because of its apparent partisan motivation. Similarly, 
although the federal judiciary in 2012 blocked enforcement of newly enacted state laws that presented 
a serious risk of disenfranchising valid voters, see Hasen, supra note 14, at 1871–72, these judicial 
decrees did not entirely eliminate partisan electoral legislation. Virginia’s new voter ID law, less 
stringent than others but nonetheless adopted by a Republican-dominated legislature over the 
objections of Democrats, was permitted to take effect. See Laura Vozzella, Justice Department Upholds 
Va. Voter ID Law, Governor Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/virginia-politics/post/justice-department-upholds-virginia-voter-id-law/2012/08/ 
20/76d609f6-eb2a-11e1-a80b-9f898562d010_blog.html. 
19. Randall deserves a modern biography. In the meantime, the best available source is Sidney 
I. Pomerantz, Samuel Jackson Randall: Protectionist-Democrat, 1863–1890 (1932) (unpublished 
Master’s degree thesis, Columbia University) (on file with Columbia University). Pomerantz, it 
appears, went on to become a history professor at the City College of New York, and his master’s 
thesis was a worthy start to his career. But it is clearly the work of a budding scholar, and Randall’s 
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before the scheduled inauguration of the next president, when the outcome of the 
dispute was still very much in doubt and indeed had reached its final, critical 
juncture.20 It is not too much to say that on that day the nation was at the edge of 
a constitutional precipice, and Randall’s nonpartisan conduct as Speaker of the 
House pulled the nation back from the abyss.21 For the remainder of the 
nineteenth century, Randall’s role in protecting our nation from the possibility of 
cataclysmic disaster was well recognized among those who recounted the drama of 
the Hayes-Tilden dispute.22 Yet, sadly, nowadays almost no one knows of 
Randall’s heroism at this peak moment of electoral crisis, which has been eclipsed 
instead by the Electoral Commission (which I mentioned earlier) in recent 
retellings of the Hayes-Tilden affair.23 Therefore, let me tell you Randall’s story, 
and we then can assess its significance for us today. 
 
role in history would benefit from someone with a more seasoned perspective. See also Albert Virgil 
House, Jr., The Political Career of Samuel Jackson Randall (Aug. 13, 1934) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Wisconsin) (on file with University of Wisconsin), available at http://minds.wisconsin 
.edu/handle/1793/406. 
20. See HAWORTH, supra note 11, at 274 (“[T]he proceedings entered upon a new and 
dangerous phase.”). 
21. One study of Randall’s role in the “electoral deadlock following the presidential election 
of 1876” concluded that, if it had not been for Randall, “that deadlock would not have been 
peaceably resolved.” FRANK B. EVANS, PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS, 1872-1877: A STUDY IN 
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 309 (1966). That study sees Randall’s motives as complex, but acknowledges 
those who viewed Randall’s conduct as setting aside partisanship. For example, that study quotes a 
letter sent to Randall praising him for his uniquely nonpartisan virtue at the crucial moment: “You 
stand alone among all our statesmen, and even with judges, as the only one who can in the discharge 
of his duties rise above party.” Id. at 305 (quoting J.B. Brawley to Randall, March 9, 1877). 
22. Writing in 1906, in volume seven of his monumental History of the United States, James 
Rhodes declared that for his “skilful and resolute guidance” of the House’s proceedings on March 1, 
Randall deserved “the respect and admiration of the country and of the world.” 7 JAMES FORD 
RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE COMPROMISE OF 1850 TO THE FINAL 
RESTORATION OF HOME RULE AT THE SOUTH IN 1877, at 278, 285 (1906); see also HAWORTH, supra 
note 11, at 276–77 (expressing a similar sentiment). 
23. The Electoral Commission has been emphasized since 2000 because of the comparison 
between its role in the Hayes-Tilden dispute and the Supreme Court’s role in Bush v. Gore. See 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS 5–6 (2005). 
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Now, in telling this story, I wish to warn you at the outset that Randall was 
no saint. He was a ward politician from Philadelphia, a product of machine 
politics, who at points in his career was associated with some ugly electoral 
tactics.24 Even by the standards of his time, he was a racist, with backward views 
regarding the status of blacks in America. Before the Civil War, he was against the 
abolition of slavery, and although he fought for the Union, he consistently 
promoted pro-Southern positions during the war and Reconstruction.25 In 1864, 
when Lincoln worked so tenaciously for the adoption of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Randall gave his first major speech as a junior representative in 
 
24. Pomerantz does not hide Randall’s blemishes. For example, Pomerantz describes 
Randall’s campaign for reelection to the House in 1868 as “a characteristic machine politics affair.” 
Pomerantz, supra note 19, at 27. Another member of Congress characterized Randall’s victory that 
year as tainted by the corruption of electoral fraud that included “‘persons voted in the name of dead 
men, absent men, and men in the penitentiary’” and was sufficiently widespread to require the 
invalidation of one ward’s entire return. Id. at 28; see also House, supra note 19, at 10–11 (“Randall 
knew the tricks of ward politics and could play the game with the best of them.”). 
25. See Pomerantz, supra note 19, at 11–13. 
Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio Samuel J. Tilden of New York 
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opposition to this transformative measure.26 He likewise opposed the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the major pieces of civil rights legislation that Reconstructionist 
Republicans passed in Congress.27 Randall had even opposed permitting African 
Americans to serve in the Union Army.28 
Moreover, for much of his career, Randall was a loyal partisan. He rose to 
leadership among the Democrats in Congress, while that party was the minority, 
by becoming an especially skilled parliamentarian and consistently using every 
available tactic to thwart Republican measures.29 Accordingly, in 1877 he could 
have been expected to act as a particularly partisan Democrat, employing his 
expertise in parliamentary procedure in the effort to get Tilden, as his party’s 
candidate, inaugurated as president. Indeed, Randall was chosen Speaker by his 
fellow partisans in December of 1876, as the dispute over the presidential election 
was heating up, precisely to play this role.30 Randall was Tilden’s preference 
among the alternative Democratic candidates for Speaker, a fact that was 
instrumental to his winning the position.31 Thus, there was every expectation 
among Democrats that Randall would do all in his power as Speaker to deliver the 
presidency to Tilden.32 
Yet on March 1, at the crucial moment, Randall did not do everything in his 
power as Speaker to contribute to the partisan effort to put Tilden in the White 
House. Instead, acting contrary to intense pressure from fellow Democrats in the 
House, who wanted to pursue every available means that might lead to Tilden’s 
inauguration, Randall made a decisive procedural ruling that had the effect of 
assuring that Hayes would be the one inaugurated on March 4. He made this 
procedural ruling based on his sense of duty to the nation as a whole. He told his 
fellow Democrats, whom he so severely disappointed, that he was acting 
“according to his conscience,”33 not as someone beholden to his caucus.  
In acting this way on March 1, Randall put country before party, as the old 
saying goes, and thus was motivated by the kind of nonpartisan virtue I am 
intending to illustrate. In depicting Randall’s conduct, I wish to portray what we 
might call a “profile in electoral courage,” drawing upon the title of then-Senator 
 
26. Id. at 12. For anyone who has seen Spielberg’s film Lincoln, the fact that Randall was on 
the wrong side of this great struggle is especially poignant. 
27. Id. at 19. 
28. Id. at 13 n.3. 
29. Id. at 34, 51. 
30. Id. at 63; see also JEFFREY A. JENKINS & CHARLES STEWART III, FIGHTING FOR THE 
SPEAKERSHIP: THE HOUSE AND THE RISE OF PARTY GOVERNMENT 255 (2013).  
31. EVANS, supra note 21, at 289 (stating that Randall “was Tilden’s personal choice for the 
speakership”). 
32. The historian Michael Holt paraphrases Randall as telling Tilden that “[h]e had been 
picked . . . primarily to make sure that Tilden was counted in as president, and he promised to heed 
any instructions Tilden cared to send him to achieve that goal.” HOLT, supra note 11, at 204. 
33. 5 CONG. REC. 2033 (1877). 
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John Kennedy’s famous book about senators who in other circumstances put 
country before party.34 
By calling Randall’s conduct on March 1 virtuous and courageous, I do not 
mean to suggest that Randall was entirely pure of heart. Again, he was no saint, 
neither that day, nor any other. But one need not be a saint to be a hero, and one 
need not always be a hero to act heroically on a particular occasion. Human beings 
are complicated creatures, usually acting with multiple motives, some even hidden 
from themselves.35 Heroism in the moment does not require unalloyed purity even 
in that instant. It simply requires that that the balance of considerations tends 
toward virtue, seeking achievement of the wider public interest, rather than the 
pursuit of narrower, more self-interested aims. 
My claim then is that on March 1 virtue won out in the competition for 
Randall’s allegiance. He acted that day in accordance with the better angel of his 
nature (despite, ironically, being such a foe of Lincoln in his earlier years). And 
whatever his tendency towards partisanship at other times in his career, even at 
other times during the whole Hayes-Tilden dispute, his decision to put country 
before party on March 1 could not have come at a more important—and, as we 
shall see, more trying—moment, when it would have been easy to succumb to the 
intense pressure of partisanship that he faced (and when others in his position 
likely would have done so). It was not at all easy for Randall to act as he did on 
 
34. JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE (1955). Because Randall was not a senator, 
he was not a candidate for inclusion in the Kennedy book. (In discussing Senator Lucius Lamar, the 
book praised him for supporting the Electoral Commission of 1877, even though its decision went 
against his party’s interests. See id. at 183–85. But Lamar’s role in procuring a peaceful resolution of 
the disputed Hayes-Tilden election was far less significant than Randall’s, especially after the 
Commission began its deliberations—since the House, and not the Senate, was the locus of 
potentially pivotal conflict as events moved ever closer to the scheduled presidential inauguration on 
March 4. Lamar is thus included in the Kennedy book primarily for reasons other than his role in the 
Hayes-Tilden dispute. Still, it is significant that Profiles in Courage recognized that acting contrary to 
party interest in the context of that momentous dispute was worthy of special commendation.) 
35. Henry Watterson, the powerful Louisville journalist (and one-term congressman during 
the 1877 battle for the presidency), commented on the inevitable ambiguity of motives underlying the 
decisions that ultimately gave Hayes the White House: 
The contrary promptings, not always crooked; the double constructions possible to men’s 
actions; the intermingling of ambition and patriotism beneath the lash of party spirit; often 
wrong unconscious of itself; sometimes equivocation deceiving itself; in short, the tangled 
web of good and ill inseparable from great affairs of loss and gain, made debatable ground 
for every step of the Hayes-Tilden proceeding. 
Henry Watterson, The Hayes-Tilden Contest for the Presidency, 86 CENTURY 3, 4 (1913). EVANS, supra note 
21, at 306, invokes this passage, finding it “particularly applicable” to Randall. I concur, except that I 
depict Randall’s decisive conduct on March 1 more charitably than Evans does. His portrait of 
Randall is affected by Randall’s behavior during the entire month of February. I do not dispute that 
Randall sometimes acted out of partisan or self-interested motives during that period. But for me the 
key point is the specific decision Randall made on March 1 to deny partisan Democrats a crucial vote 
that they wanted the House to take (as I describe subsequently). The explanation for that specific 
decision, and not the entirety of Randall’s conduct during the Hayes-Tilden dispute, is what I am 
after, to the extent that it can be retrieved from this historical vantage point. 
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March 1. On the contrary, it was exceedingly challenging, as many recognized at 
the time.36 Thus, his conduct is worthy of being called heroic, and perhaps our 
generation can take some comfort in knowing that ordinary politicians, who are 
no superheroes and act as conventional politicians in their narrow-minded partisan 
pursuits throughout most of their careers, are nonetheless capable of specific acts 
of heroism when the occasion calls for it. 
A. Some Background for Understanding March 1, 1877 
To understand the significance of what Randall did on March 1, we need to 
set the stage. The relevant law is complicated, so bear with me. The same statute 
that created the Electoral Commission also set up a procedure for handling the 
electoral votes from each of the states.37 Congress, in a special joint session, would 
consider each state in alphabetical order. The two houses, however, would 
separate to consider any objection to the counting of a state’s electoral votes that 
was voiced in the joint session. If there was only one certificate of electoral votes 
from the state, then it would take both Houses of Congress (acting separately) to 
reject that state’s electoral votes. However, if there was more than one certificate 
of electoral votes from the state, then those multiple certificates would first be 
sent to the Electoral Commission, and whatever the Commission decided with 
respect to that state would prevail unless both Houses of Congress (again, acting 
separately) subsequently rejected the Commission’s decision. Thus, because both 
Houses of Congress were required to reject the Commission’s decision, an 
affirmation by one House would be enough to sustain the Commission’s decision. 
The overlooked but decisive moment in the whole dispute arose as Congress 
 
36. Pomerantz, supra note 19, at 73–74 (quoting the New York World as opining that Randall 
“had endeavored to be fair to both sides and had pleased neither”). Afterwards, “even the most 
partisan Democrats,” who had bitterly opposed him, acknowledged that he “‘did what was right.’” 
EVANS, supra note 21, at 305 (quoting Letter from C.B. Hurst to Randall (Mar. 8, 1877)). 
37. The statute is the Electoral Count Act of 1877, ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227 (1877), enacted on 
January 29 as a compromise measure designed to avert the situation in which the Republican-
controlled Senate insisted that Hayes be inaugurated, while the Democrat-controlled House remained 
equally insistent that Tilden become president—a deadlock that would have triggered a constitutional 
crisis. See WILLIAM MCKENDREE SPRINGER, COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 
13, at 477–78 (1877). A verbatim copy of the entire statute is reprinted on pages four and five of 
ELECTORAL COUNT OF 1877 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1877). Randall voted for the 
compromise statute and helped shape its provisions. See Pomerantz, supra note 19, at 66 n.10. He 
disapproved of an earlier version, which would have picked the justices to serve on the Electoral 
Commission by lottery. See HOLT, supra note 11, at 213–14. What was adopted instead was the plan, 
as mentioned earlier, of having the fifth justice chosen by the other four (two Democrats and two 
Republicans) with the specific purpose of serving as a neutrally impartial tiebreaker if and when 
necessary. Id. at 214–15. When they crafted this plan, Randall and other Democrats thought it would 
lead to Tilden’s eventual victory, as they envisioned Justice Davis occupying the tiebreaking seat and 
they did not think he would rule against Tilden on all of the issues likely to come before the 
Commission. See HAWORTH, supra note 11, at 209. For Tilden to become president, he needed to 
prevail on just one of the four states in dispute at the time (Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and South 
Carolina), whereas Hayes needed to win all four. 
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came close to the end of the alphabet, when it was time to take up Vermont. With 
respect to four states, most recently South Carolina, the Commission already had 
issued its eight-to-seven rulings to award those states’ electoral votes to Hayes. 
The Republican-controlled Senate had sustained those rulings. Thus, under the 
terms of the statute, the electoral votes of those four states were added to Hayes’s 
column. 
The special joint session of Congress was chaired by the president of the 
Senate, as required by both the statute and the Twelfth Amendment to the 
Constitution.38 The president of the Senate at the time was actually the president 
pro tem, Republican Thomas Ferry of Michigan, because the vice president of the 
United States (who is normally the president of the Senate) had died and had not 
been replaced.39 The joint session got to Vermont on the last day in February, 
having started at the beginning of the alphabet with Alabama on the first day of 
that month.40 
 
Figure 4: Senator Thomas Ferry 
  
 
38. The Twelfth Amendment states: “The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be 
counted.” U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The statute specifically provided that, when the Senate and 
House convene in joint session to count the electoral votes, “the President of the Senate shall be their 
presiding officer.” § 1, 19 Stat. at 227. 
39. HOLT, supra note 11, at 206. 
40. A transcript of the proceedings of the Joint Session as it took up Vermont can be found in 
ELECTORAL COUNT OF 1877, supra note 37, at 711–17. 
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Figure 5: Senator Ferry Presiding over Joint Session41 
In the joint session, Senator Ferry announced that he had received a single 
certificate of electoral votes from Vermont and asked if there were any objections 
to it. There were indeed objections, from Democrats. Much more important, 
however, was a surprise development. Representative Abram Hewitt of New 
York—who was chair of the national Democratic Party and the principal manager 
of Tilden’s presidential campaign—announced that he was in possession of a 
second certificate of electoral votes from Vermont. Hewitt wanted to give that 
second certificate to Ferry so that Vermont would need to go to the Commission 
under the terms of the statute.42 
 
41. Counting the Electoral Vote—David Dudley Field Objects to the Vote of Florida, HARPER’S 
WEEKLY, Feb. 17, 1877, at 191. 
42. Hewitt’s second certificate was premised on a claim that one of Vermont’s Republican 
electors had been ineligible on the ground that he served as a federal postmaster at the time and 
therefore violated the constitutional requirement that presidential electors not hold any other federal 
office. See HOLT, supra note 11, at 201. The claim was substantively dubious at best, but that was not 
the point as it was procedurally invalid at the time Hewitt advanced it. ALLAN NEVINS, ABRAM S. 
HEWITT 383 (1967). Still, it served as a vehicle for stalling the entire process so close to Inauguration 
Day, and that basic fact is what mattered at the moment. 
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Figure 6: Representative Abram Hewitt 
Hewitt’s purpose in wanting Vermont sent to the Commission was not based 
on a belief that the Commission would rule in favor of the second certificate. 
Given the Commission’s four prior rulings, Hewitt knew that the Commission 
would rule in favor of the first certificate, the one that Ferry already had, which 
awarded the state’s electoral votes to Hayes. Hewitt knew, too, that the 
Republican-controlled Senate surely would sustain the Commission’s ruling and 
thus Vermont would still go for Hayes under the terms of the statute. But Hewitt’s 
purpose was simply to delay the count.43 Hardline Democrats hoped that sending 
Vermont to the Electoral Commission might cause the clock to run out—that 
March 4 would arrive without the complete count of all states having been 
finished.44 In that situation, the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives 
plausibly could assert that under the Constitution it was entitled unilaterally to 
 
43. NEVINS, supra note 42, at 383 (explaining how Hewitt hatched the plan of using the 
purported second certificate of Vermont as “means by which he effectuated the delay”). 
44. Hewitt’s biographer argues that, in seeking delay, Hewitt was not attempting to derail the 
count completely in order to enable Democrats to claim that Tilden was constitutionally entitled to 
the presidency. NEVINS, supra note 42, at 379–81. Instead, the biographer asserts that Hewitt wanted 
delay solely to give the Democrats, especially those from the South, more leverage in negotiating 
concessions from Hayes in exchange for their acquiescence in Hayes’s inauguration. See id. at 381–84. 
Haworth, by contrast, doubts that Hewitt’s aims in seeking delay were limited only to securing a 
better bargain. See HAWORTH, supra note 11, at 279 n.1 (characterizing this account of Hewitt’s 
behavior as a post hoc rationalization for his “failure to secure the seating of Tilden”). But even if 
bargaining leverage was Hewitt’s only motive, he was playing with fire. The only way that his tactic 
could be effective in inducing greater concessions from Hayes was by appearing entirely serious in 
threatening to block completion of the count before March 4—and thus appearing entirely willing to 
send the nation off the constitutional precipice. Moreover, as Hewitt well knew, there were many 
hardliners in his party who adamantly and ferociously wanted to do just that and who were in no way 
interested in delaying the count merely as a bargaining ploy. See NEVINS, supra note 42, at 379–80. 
Thus, once Hewitt publicly proclaimed the existence of the second Vermont certificate and set the 
process of delay in motion, it was entirely conceivable the move (whatever Hewitt’s actual motive) 
could play into the hands of the hardliners and actually achieve complete derailment of the count. 
When Hewitt made his move in the joint session, in other words, there was no guarantee he could 
keep his delay-seeking effort limited in scope and under control. As even his biographer 
acknowledges, Hewitt may “ha[ve] created a Frankenstein’s monster that would overpower” the 
proceedings. Id. at 383. 
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elect Tilden as president, since neither candidate had received a majority of 
electoral votes by the prescribed deadline of March 4.45 
 
Figure 7: Will the House Provoke a Crisis?46 
 
If the House of Representatives took that unilateral step, and if Tilden 
attempted to assume the authority of commander in chief on that basis, it would 
have been a genuine constitutional crisis. The Republicans were prepared to resist, 
by military force if necessary, any claim by Tilden to the powers of commander in 
 
45. The relevant provision of the Constitution at the time was the Twelfth Amendment. It has 
since been supplemented by the Twentieth Amendment, adopted in 1933, which contains a 
mechanism for determining what should happen if the time for inaugurating a new president comes 
and goes without the president having yet been chosen. See U.S. CONST. amend XX, § 3. But back in 
1877, the only applicable constitutional text was the Twelfth Amendment and all it stated was that “if 
no person have [a] majority” of electoral votes, then the House by a special procedure “shall choose 
immediately, by ballot, the President.” U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The Twelfth Amendment did 
provide that if the House itself failed to choose a president by March 4 “whenever the right of choice 
shall devolve upon them,” then the new vice president (as chosen by the Senate) “shall act as 
President.” Id. But in 1877 there was no risk of the House failing to pick Tilden “immediately,” as the 
Twelfth Amendment requires, assuming the House had the authority to do so. Thus, the question was 
whether the House was entitled to do so in the circumstance where no person had yet been declared 
the official winner of a majority of electoral votes because a dispute over the counting of electoral 
votes had left the count incomplete by the time March 4 arrived. Although the text of the 
Constitution was frustratingly—and dangerously—ambiguous on this crucial point, in 1877 
Democrats in the House (including Randall before the enactment of the compromise statute) took the 
position that they were authorized to unilaterally elect Tilden in this situation. See HAWORTH, supra 
note 11, at 177; HOLT, supra note 11, at 208. For a discussion of the problems caused by the Twelfth 
Amendment’s ambiguity, see Colvin & Foley, The Twelfth Amendment, supra note 12. 
46. Thomas Nast, A Truce—Not a Compromise, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/ 
pictures/item/93510088 (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
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chief asserted on the basis of a unilateral declaration from the Democrats in the 
House.47 The Republicans would have claimed that Ferry, as president of the 
Senate, had the constitutional authority under the Twelfth Amendment to 
complete the count in favor of Hayes by March 4, notwithstanding a formal 
declaration to the contrary from the House of Representatives.48 It does not 
matter which side had the better of the argument in terms of constitutional 
interpretation. The point is that on February 28, just four days before the deadline, 
there were recalcitrant Democrats in the House who were prepared, even at this 
late date, to insist on their constitutional prerogative to elect Tilden in the event of 
an incomplete count of electoral votes. It was constitutional brinkmanship, and 
Hewitt’s claim of a second certificate from Vermont seemed to all the world a 





47. According to one of Hayes’s biographers, “there was much talk, some apparently of an 
informed nature, that Hayes would be inaugurated with the support of the army under Grant—in 
short by a kind of military dictatorship.” HARRY BARNARD, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES AND HIS 
AMERICA 341 (Russell & Russell 1967) (1954). Another Hayes biographer likewise observes that 
“Republicans must have won” if the matter came to military conflict and thus some leaders of that 
party, including Hayes himself to a point, were not averse to resorting to force to settle the matter. 
H.J. ECKENRODE, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES: STATESMAN OF REUNION 205–06 (1930). 
48. Haworth puts the point this way: 
President Grant was . . . a Republican; and, although anxious for a peaceful settlement, he 
had given out that he intended to see his duly declared successor inaugurated. It was well 
known that in case the two houses were unable to come to an agreement Mr. Ferry would 
proceed to count the votes, and would declare Hayes the President-elect. Mr. Hayes would 
then be inaugurated under the protection of the United States army. 
HAWORTH, supra note 11, at 208 (citation omitted); see also HOLT, supra note 11, at 207 (noting that 
Republicans claimed, if push came to shove, under the Twelfth Amendment “the president of the 
Senate had the exclusive power and authority to count the electoral votes and resolve disputes over 
contested returns from different states”). 
49. See HAWORTH, supra note 11, at 274–77; see also BARNARD, supra note 47, at 391–92 
(describing Hewitt’s conduct over Vermont as “giving appearance that he had joined the 
filibusterers”). 
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Figure 8: “The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate  
and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes  
















The gravest danger was the possibility that, when March 4 arrived, there 
would be two separate inaugurations and thus two competing claims to the office 
of the presidency and its powers of commander in chief. Just imagine Hayes 
asserting this authority by virtue of a pronouncement from Senator Ferry, with 
Tilden purporting to be president based on a vote to that effect from the House 
of Representatives. Had the conflict reached that point, in the view of many at the 
time (as well as since), it would have caused a second civil war.51 Some generals in 
the army were prepared to side with Tilden, and there were state militias that 
could be mobilized to support the Democrats.52 It is thus difficult to overstate the 
severity of the situation—and the potential threat to the nation—when Hewitt 
 
50. The Presidency—Mr. Ferry Announcing the Result of the Count, HARPER’S WEEKLY, March 17, 
1877, at 205. 
51. Haworth titles a chapter of his book “Compromise or Civil War?” and opens the chapter 
with the observation that “at the time probably more people dreaded an armed conflict than had 
anticipated a like outcome to the secession movement of 1860–61.” HAWORTH, supra note 11, at 168. 
One Hayes biography describes the danger in even more apocalyptic terms: 
If war had come it would not have been such a contest as the Secession War but a true 
civil war between parties instead of between sections. Almost every State would have been 
the scene of fighting, and . . . it is probable that freedom would have perished in a struggle 
between parties for the control of the government. 
ECKENRODE, supra note 47, at 205–06. 
52. HAWORTH, supra note 11, at 194 (“The enrolling of Democratic minute-men went 
forward until military organization to a certain degree had been effected in eleven states, and a 
commander-in-chief, namely General Corse, had been tentatively agreed upon.” (citations omitted)). 
Haworth adds that other generals were considered as well. Id. at 194 n.3; accord BARNARD, supra note 
47, at 341–42. 
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made his surprise announcement in the joint session that he possessed a second 
certificate of electoral votes from Vermont. 
Ferry refused to accept Hewitt’s second certificate. Ferry said that, under the 
controlling congressional statute, any purported certificate needed to have arrived 
in his possession by February 1; this purported second certificate had not, and 
thus it was untimely and could not be considered.53 Ferry then ruled from the 
Chair, over the protests of Democrats, that Vermont was a single-certificate state 
and thus the two Houses of Congress were supposed to separate and consider 
solely whether to accept or reject this single certificate. 
Later that same day, the Senate voted quickly to accept the single certificate 
from Vermont. The House, however, recessed until the next day: Thursday, 
March 1.54 Here is where the drama gets really interesting and becomes most 
intense. 
B. The Decisive Day and the House’s “Stormiest Session”55 
Under the terms of the statute, the debate over the single certificate from 
Vermont was limited to just two hours.56 This time limit had been put in the 
statute precisely to avoid attempts to delay the completion of the count. When the 
House convened on March 1, hardline Democrats argued that this two-hour 
debate on the single certificate should not yet begin. The hardliners argued that 
the House, instead, should insist on sending Vermont back to Senator Ferry with 
the demand that the count not proceed unless and until Vermont was recognized 
as a two-certificate state and sent to the Commission on that basis.57 
 
53. The compromise statute was not entirely precise on this point, but it did speak of the 
certificates of electoral votes from the states being “opened by the President of the Senate” on 
February 1, once the joint session got underway, thereby implying that the certificates needed to have 
arrived in his possession by that time. Moreover, going all the way back to 1792, Congress by statute 
had specified a date by which certificates of Electoral Votes must have arrived from the states in 
order to be counted. See H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 13 § 2. Therefore, Ferry was on solid ground in 
asserting that Hewitt’s second certificate from Vermont was procedurally barred because he had not 
received it by February 1. 
54. 5 CONG. REC. 2028 (1877). 
55. For the official account of what transpired in the House chamber that day, see 5 CONG. 
REC. 2031–35 (1877). But as one eyewitness later recalled: “To have an adequate conception of this 
scene of painful disorder, one must multiply this report [in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD] by three 
or four. No system of reporting, no corps of reporters, was adequate to such an occasion.” James 
Monroe, The Hayes Tilden Electoral Commission, 72 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 521, 536 (1893). 
56. Section three of the statute provided: 
That when the two houses separate to decide upon an objection that may have been made 
to the counting of any electoral vote or votes from any State, or for the decision of any 
other question pertinent thereto, each Senator and Representative may speak to such 
objection or question ten minutes, and not oftener than once: Provided, That after such 
debate has lasted two hours, it shall be in the power of a majority of each house to direct 
that the main question shall be put without further debate. 
H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 13 § 3, at 459 (1877). 
57. Here is how one of the hardliners framed their argument: 
   It is very evident that the proposition submitted by the gentleman from Illinois is one 
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Randall, as Speaker, presided over these deliberations in the House. He 
announced from the chair that, while he agreed with the view that Ferry should 
have treated Vermont as a two-certificate state and thus should have given it to 
the Commission, he believed that under the statute he was duty-bound to accept 
Ferry’s ruling as final and thus start the clock on the two-hour debate, enabling the 
electoral count to continue.58 The hardline Democrats insisted that Randall let the 
House vote as a body on their position—in other words, to vote on whether to 
send Vermont back to Senator Ferry and the joint session without undertaking 
any consideration of Vermont as a single-certificate state. Yet Randall refused to 
permit the vote that that the hardliners so vociferously demanded. 
Here are the key passages from the Congressional Record at the crucial 
juncture where Randall held firm to his position that the clock must start for the 
 
which must be preliminarily considered before you proceed to the consideration of the other 
objections which are made. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. SPRINGER] offered [in the 
joint session on the previous day] an objection to the closing of the objections to the vote 
from Vermont, unless the other return which had been made and of which the President 
of the Senate had been apprised [by Hewitt] should also be submitted by the President of 
the Senate in the presence of the two Houses. The failure on the part of the President of 
the Senate to do this, it is contended, makes the two Houses powerless to entertain any 
resolution upon that question. I think there is something more involved in this than a mere 
technical point, and that you cannot proceed now to consider the objections to the electoral vote of the 
State of Vermont predicated upon the idea that there is but one single return from that State. That is 
what the resolution of the gentleman from New York [Fernando Wood, a Democrat who 
was willing to let Hayes be inaugurated] proposes; and he reads the concluding clause of 
the first section of the law in order to demonstrate that in a case where there is but a single 
return it is the duty of the two Houses immediately to proceed and decide upon the 
objection by a vote. No one denies that. 
   But the question that lies back behind this is whether the certificates from the State of Vermont are 
single or dual in their character. If they are dual in their character [then] the clause of the law to which the 
gentleman from New York appeals does not apply. On the contrary, if this is a return which it is the duty 
of the President of the Senate to open and submit to the consideration of the two Houses, Vermont then 
becomes a State with dual electoral returns, which should be submitted under the law to the electoral 
commission. 
5 CONG REC. 2031 (1877) (emphasis added). By this argument, the hardliners made clear that in their 
view the House was not entitled to move forward under the statute in treating Vermont as a single-
certificate state, but instead must go back to the joint session so that it could be properly treated as a 
dual-certificate state (according to their lights). On the basis of this argument, the hardliners 
attempted to maneuver the House into voting on their motion to go back to the joint session without 
considering Vermont as a single-certificate state. 
58. Here are Randall’s words on this point: 
The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to say that, with great respect for all parties concerned, 
he considers that a grave mistake and wrong was committed yesterday in the joint meeting 
of the two Houses in this: that the Presiding Officer refused to receive even for opening 
and reading for information a package which had all the surroundings of an authentic and 
duly attested paper in relation to an electoral vote of the State of Vermont. The Chair, in 
one aspect of this case, thinks that he would be called upon to rule that the action of the 
Presiding Officer of the joint convention on yesterday was wrong. He does not think that he 
possesses that power; neither in a technical sense, as he understands it, does he believe that the action of the 
joint convention can be reviewed in this House in the manner proposed. 
5 CONG. REC. 2032 (1877) (emphasis added). On this ground, Speaker Randall set himself against the 
hardliners in his own party who wanted to go back to the joint session without even considering the 
objections to the one certificate that Ferry had accepted from Vermont. 
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two-hour debate on Vermont, without first going back to the joint session to 
revisit the issue of the second certificate: 
  Mr. O’BRIEN. Do I understand the Chair to rule that the two hours’ 
debate is now to commence? 
  The SPEAKER. The Chair so rules. 
  . . . . 
  Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, sir, I appeal from that decision. I contend 
that there is no power in this House to proceed to the consideration of 
this question until we know what the question is. Under the present 
circumstances we do not know what the question is. . . . [U]ntil that 
[second] certificate is opened it is impossible for us to know what 
objections we are to consider. 
  . . . . 
  Mr. O’BRIEN. Does not the Chair entertain the appeal from his 
decision? 
  Mr. CAULFIELD. I insist on my appeal from the decision of the 
Chair. 
  Mr. SPEAKER. The Chair declines to entertain the appeal.  
  Cries of “That is right,” and applause. 
  Mr. SPRINGER. I hope the Chair will not insist upon that position. 
This is one of the most important questions that ever came before this 
House. [Cries of “Regular Order!”] I insist that this appeal must be entertained 
and that we must know whether this is a case that has gone to the commission or 
whether it is now to be considered by the separate Houses. This is not a dilatory 
motion, but one that arises upon a vital provision of the electoral law; 
and I ask the Chair to entertain the appeal. 
  The SPEAKER. The Chair considers that he is bound by the law— 
  Mr. SPRINGER. I want the law enforced. . . . If this case under the law 
has gone to the commission, it is there now by the operation of the law and we have 
nothing before us. 
  . . . . 
  Mr. BEEBE (who addressed the Chair amid cries of “Order!” and 
great confusion) was understood to say: Mr. Speaker, I have stood with 
the majority of this House against every proposition to delay obedience 
to this law. I acknowledge my obligations under that law. I recognize the 
further fact that we are here not only under that, but in the exercise of 
every prerogative and privilege guaranteed by the Constitution to this 
House. [Cries of “Order!” mingled with applause.] Will the Chair 
entertain the motion— 
  The SPEAKER. The Chair will entertain no motion. 
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  Mr. BEEBE. Then I charge the Speaker with doing what I have 
complained of the electoral commission for doing, violating the very law 
under which we are operating. 
  Mr. RICE. The Speaker is usurping power. 
  The SPEAKER. The Chair usurps no power. 
  Mr. BEEBE. Ninety members of this House demand that appeal from 
the decision of the Chair, and it cannot be had. . . . Will the Chair state 
the reason for his ruling? 
  The SPEAKER. The Chair decides according to his conscience and 
the law.59 
At this point, “[p]andemonium broke loose.”60 Eyewitnesses described it as 
probably the “stormiest” session that had ever happened in the House.61 The New 
York Times reported: “This action of the Speaker seemed to set the [hardliners] 
wild with excitement. . . . Many ladies, fearing that a free fight was about to [break 
out], left the galleries.”62 The Times of London added these details: “Every member 
was on his feet; nearly all were screaming. . . . Some of the members grasped their 
revolvers, and there was imminent danger of personal collisions.”63 
The hardliners knew that their position was doomed if they could not prevail 
upon Randall to let the House vote on their proposal (which, again, was to stop 
the entire process unless and until Ferry acquiesced in sending Vermont to the 
Commission). If instead the House took back to Ferry its objection to the single 
certificate he recognized, then Ferry would simply count Vermont for Hayes 
under the terms of the statute, since the Senate already had voted to accept that 
certificate. Moreover, and this is a crucial point, Ferry would do the same even if 
the House tacked on an extra complaint about Ferry’s refusal to accept the second 
certificate at the same time that the House submitted its formal objection to the 
one certificate he accepted. Ferry could simply ignore that extra—indeed 
superfluous—complaint, as long as the House completed its duty under the 
statute to state its formal objection to the single certificate.64 
For this reason, it was absolutely crucial that the Democratic hardliners 
 
59. 5 CONG. REC. 2033 (1877) (emphasis added). 
60. Pomerantz, supra note 19, at 70. 
61. Monroe, who witnessed the scene himself, later quoted the New York Tribune as fairly 
describing “such a scene of disorder as has probably never been witnessed in the stormiest scenes of 
Congress before.” Monroe, supra note 55, at 536. Haworth cited Monroe in his own description, 
which begins: “The session of [March 1] was probably the stormiest ever witnessed in any House of 
Representatives.” HAWORTH, supra note 11, at 276. Others have echoed the point even more 
forcefully: “The House session of March 1, 1877, was ‘probably the wildest that ever occurred in any 
American legislative body.’” EVANS, supra note 21, at 304 (quoting HERBERT BRUCE FULLER, THE 
SPEAKERS OF THE HOUSE 199 (1909)). 
62. The Last State Counted., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1877, at 1. 
63. Latest Intelligence: The Presidential Election, TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 1877, at 5. 
64. Randall was careful to make sure that the House did conduct this single-certificate vote 
before going back to the joint session. See 5 CONG. REC. 2053–54 (1877). 
2013] SAMUEL RANDALL’S ELECTORAL HEROISM 497 
 
prevent the House from undertaking the two-hour debate under the statute on the 
single certificate from Vermont. As soon as that two-hour debate occurred, Hayes 
was all but inaugurated.65 Conversely, however, if the hardliners could succeed in 
stopping that two-hour debate from happening, then they could see their way to 
Tilden’s inauguration. If the House went back to Ferry without undertaking that 
two-hour debate, then the whole process halted unless Ferry was willing to 
reconsider his rejection of the second certificate. Yet it was most unlikely that 
Ferry would do that. Thus, with the entire electoral count stopped dead in its 
tracks, March 4 would arrive with the count incomplete, and the House could 
proceed to vote Tilden into the presidency under its interpretation of the Twelfth 
Amendment.  
For these reasons, this climatic moment on March 1 was truly the “do or 
die” pivot point of the whole disputed Hayes-Tilden election. For precisely the 
same reasons, the hardline Democrats became apoplectically furious when Randall 
refused to let the House even vote on whether or not to adopt their position. 
When George Beebe, a Democrat from New York, asked Randall for the basis of 
his ruling and then heard Randall’s reply—“The Chair decides according to his 
conscience and the law”—Beebe spun out of control.66 As the New York Times 
described it: “Beebe mounted his desk, and running over the tops of four desks in 
front of him, denounced the rulings of the Speaker as unlawful and unjust. . . . 
The noise and confusion which was caused by Beebe’s disgraceful performance 
exceeded anything ever known in Congress.”67 
 
Figure 9: Representative George Beebe of New York 
 
65. In this respect, my understanding of March 1 diverges from Haworth’s. He suggests that 
the entire count still could have been derailed if at the end of the two-hour debate the House had sent 
a resolution back to Ferry demanding that Vermont go to the Commission. See HAWORTH, supra note 
11, at 278. For reasons I explain, however, Ferry simply could have ignored that resolution, counted 
Vermont for Hayes, and moved on to the next state. 
66. 5 CONG. REC. 2033 (1877). 
67. The Last State Counted, supra note 62. 
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Randall had to call upon the Sergeant-at-Arms to restrain these recalcitrant 
members of his own party. Yet by invoking this show of force against his fellow 
Democrats, Randall prevailed. The two-hour debate on Vermont’s single 
certificate indeed commenced and, once completed, the House returned to the 
joint session. Vermont’s electoral votes were duly counted for Hayes under the 
statute. The joint session then moved on to the remaining states (Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin), and the entire electoral count was finally complete at 
four o’clock the next morning, with Ferry declaring Hayes the official winner. 
 
Figure 10: Sergeant-at-Arms and His Mace68 
C. An Assessment of Randall’s Conduct 
What should we make of Randall’s adamant refusal to let the House even 
vote on the Democratic hardliners’ proposal? It cannot be explained simply as a 
desire not to take the time to call the roll. Randall let the House vote on many 
other motions during the March 1 session, including on other dilatory moves 
made by the hardliners. But not this one. 
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For Randall, it was a matter of principle. He saw it as his obligation to make 
sure, once Ferry made his ruling against the second certificate, that the House 
conduct the two-hour debate required by the statute on the single certificate from 
Vermont. He viewed this as an obligation of his Speakership even though, as a 
Democrat, he vehemently disagreed with Ferry’s ruling. Furthermore, he viewed it 
as his obligation even though, from a small-“d” perspective, refusing to let the 
House—the people’s chamber—take a vote could be seen as undemocratic. The 
hardliners certainly saw it that way, thinking that the body, rather than the chair, 
ought to have the last word on the matter. But, from Randall’s perspective, the 
rule of law came first, above all else, and in this case the rule of law required that 
he prevent the body from taking a vote that potentially could defeat the operation 
of the statute enacted for the purpose of completing the count of electoral votes 
before March 4. 
But why not just let the hardliners have their vote, as they were unlikely to 
obtain a majority of the whole House in support of their position? Randall could 
not risk the chance that the hardliners might win this vote. Even if the chance was 
fairly small, it was not negligible. There was still the possibility that the hardliners 
could prevail upon enough other Democrats to achieve approval of their motion. 
In particular, the status of Southern Democrats was still somewhat in flux. 
Southern Democrats had been bargaining with Republicans, offering to accept the 
inauguration of Hayes in exchange for promises that Hayes would remove federal 
troops from the South.69 But the deal had not yet been definitively sealed at the 
crucial moment that the hardliners were pressing Randall to let the House vote on 
their proposal.70 It was only after Randall had called upon the Sergeant-at-Arms to 
restore order—and towards the end of the two-hour debate on Vermont’s single 
certificate—that a key Southern Democrat, Representative William Levy of 
Louisiana, announced his support for letting the count proceed so that Hayes 
could be inaugurated.71 Thus, at the moment Randall stood his ground in refusing 
the vote that the hardliners ferociously wanted, it remained uncertain what the 
vote would be. 
Indeed, based on a vote that occurred at the end of the two-hour debate, 
Randall had good reason to believe that, if he had permitted a vote on the 
hardliner proposal, it could have come close to passing. Once the two-hour debate 
was over, Randall permitted a vote on a resolution demanding that Ferry accept 
the second certificate from Vermont and send the state to the Electoral 
 
69. A key meeting between leading Southern Democrats and representatives for Hayes was 
held at the Wormley Hotel on the night of February 26. See HOLT, supra note 11, at 240. 
70. On March 1, Southern Democrats were continuing to seek a commitment from outgoing 
President Grant that federal troops would not interfere with a Democratic takeover of Louisiana’s 
government. Brooks D. Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant and the Electoral Crisis of 1876–77, 11 HAYES HIST. J. 
5, 17–19 (1992); see also BARNARD, supra note 47, at 392–93 (describing the same March 1 meeting 
between Louisiana Democrats and Grant). 
71. HAWORTH, supra note 11, at 277–79. 
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Commission. Randall permitted the motion at this time, but not earlier, precisely 
because now it could not prevent the timely conclusion of the electoral count 
(since, as already mentioned, Ferry could simply ignore this resolution in favor of 
declaring the debate on Vermont complete under the terms of the statute).  
The House vote on this resolution, even after Levy had signaled the 
acceptance by Southern Democrats of Hayes’s inauguration, was close. No 
Republican, of course, voted for this resolution; 104 Republicans voted against it. 
Of the Democrats in the House, 116 voted in favor of this resolution, and only 42 
Democrats voted against it. Moreover, twenty Democrats—including Levy 
himself along with nine other Southerners—abstained from voting one way or the 
other. If instead these ten Southern Democrats along with the fifteen Southern 
Democrats who voted against the resolution had all supported it, the resolution 
would have passed 141 to 133. (The actual vote was 116 in favor and 148 
against.)72 Therefore, prior to Levy’s signal—before the beginning of the two-hour 
debate, when the hardliners wanted the vote on their proposal—if Randall had 
permitted that vote and if these twenty-five Southern Democrats had supported 
the hardliners at that crucial moment, the hardliners might have prevailed by a 
similar 141–133 margin.73 
The point then is that when Randall refused to let that vote occur, the 
uncertainty was too great—and the stakes were too high—for him to test the 
strength of the hardline position. By acting as he did, Randall prevented a genuine 
threat that the electoral count would not be complete by March 4. Thus, by 
resisting the demands of the hardliners within his own party, even by calling out 
the Sergeant-at-Arms against them when necessary, Randall was instrumental in 
thwarting the serious risk that the constitutional crisis of dueling claims to the 
 
72. See 5 CONG. REC. 2048–49 (1877). Among the 148 nays, besides 104 Republicans and 42 
Democrats, there were 2 independents. 
73. For another account that highlights Levy’s speech as the key turning point, see BARNARD, 
supra note 47, at 393–94: 
Congressman Levy hurried from the Executive Mansion to the House to carry out an 
important assignment. This was to make a speech directed at those members who, 
sincerely or not, were justifying their delaying tactics by citing the continued presence of 
federal troops in Louisiana and South Carolina. . . . That speech was accepted as the signal 
for ending the stalemate on Vermont. 
Accord FULLER, supra note 61, at 202: 
The “irreconcilables” noticed that the conservative Democrats were voting with them on 
the Vermont case. Wild with delight they saw victory already won. Suddenly Levy appeared 
on the floor. Informing Randall of the successful termination of the Wormley conference, 
word was given to abandon the contest. Levy appealed to his fellow-members to refrain 
from preventing the completion of the count and thereby protect Louisiana and South 
Carolina. The radicals rallied from the shock and sought to muster their disorganized 
hosts. But the gloom of defeat had replaced the hope of victory. 
See also C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE 
END OF RECONSTRUCTION 217–18 (1966) (describing how “the strength of the filibuster,” which 
had been “[r]einforced with new recruits” on the morning of March 1, plummeted after Levy finished 
his speech). 
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presidency would occur on Inauguration Day. In this respect, Randall’s decision to 
stand firm against the hardliners in his own party deserves to be called heroic. 
Many who witnessed what happened in the House on March 1, 1877 felt this 
way.74 Consider, for example, the view of one House member at the time—who 
later was a professor of political science at Oberlin College and who happened to 
share the name of the nation’s fifth president—James Monroe. Writing in 1893 
about the Hayes-Tilden dispute, this Oberlin professor emphasized the risk to the 
nation presented by the hardliner efforts to derail the count: “This opposition” 
once the count reached Vermont, “assumed such proportions as to fill patriotic 
minds with alarm lest the declaration of the final result should not be reached.”75 
Monroe squarely gives Randall full credit for preventing this potential disaster: 
“This calamity to the country might not have been averted, had not the man of 
the occasion been found in Samuel J. Randall, the Democratic Speaker of the 
House.”76 Monroe recognized that Randall was a “warm partisan” but immediately 
commended him for having both the “firmness and conscience” to overcome his 
partisanship on this occasion and, instead, obey “his obligations to the 
Constitution and the laws.”77 Monroe continued: “He had a clear conviction that 
it was his duty not to permit the object of the electoral law to be defeated by any 
fractious policy of obstruction.”78 Moreover, fortunately for the nation, Randall 
 
74. Pomerantz, supra note 19, at 73 (collecting the newspaper editorials that praised Randall in 
the aftermath of his conduct on March 1); see also EVANS, supra note 21, at 305 (“Randall was deluged 
with congratulations and condolences.”). Hewitt himself later credited Randall with averting a national 
calamity: 
There was much excitement and doubtless scenes of violence would have been witnessed 
but for the firmness of Speaker Randall, to whose patriotic action the country owes a debt 
of gratitude for the peaceful issue of this long, exciting, and humiliating controversy, upon 
which the attention of the country had been concentrated for many months with painful 
anxiety. 
ABRAM S. HEWITT, Secret History of the Disputed Election, 1876–77, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF ABRAM 
S. HEWITT 155, 177 (Allan Nevins ed., Kennikat Press 1965) (1937). Hewitt also claimed that Randall 
was in cahoots with him over the introduction of the second certificate from Vermont. Id. (“In this 
transaction I had the full approval and co-operation of Speaker Randall . . . .”). But this claim is 
unsubstantiated and self-serving. Hewitt wanted someone else to share the blame for provoking the 
precipitous commotion caused by the second certificate. Haworth, for one, doubted Hewitt’s veracity 
on his explanation for his conduct towards the end of the count. See HAWORTH, supra note 11, at 279 
n.1. In any event, whatever Hewitt’s actual state of mind on the morning of March 1, and whatever 
Randall’s knowledge of Hewitt’s plans and motives, there were still many other hardliners that 
morning who were eager to make the most of Hewitt’s machinations. Randall saved the country from 
the continuing threat they posed, and for that Hewitt’s praise of Randall is creditable—indeed all the 
more so because Randall was saving the country from the potential consequences of what Hewitt 
himself had unleashed. 
75. Monroe, supra note 55, at 532. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 533. 
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had the courage to match his conviction: “He had a strength of will equal to the 
emergency, and he put it to good use.”79 
 



















Some may question whether Randall really put aside partisanship in refusing 
on March 1 to let the House vote on the hardliner proposal. It is undoubtedly true 
that Democrats were not monolithic in their views on whether to go all the way to 
the brink in an attempt to get Tilden elected. Even apart from the situation of the 
Southern Democrats, who were willing to accept Hayes if the bargain was good 
enough, there were also Northern Democrats who did not want to risk a second 
civil war by fighting too hard to win the office of the presidency. Tilden himself 
was enigmatic up to the end on just how hard—and how far—he wanted to press 
his claim to the office. Thus, one could argue that Randall was actually acting in 
his party’s best interest by resisting the hardline position and, instead, seeking to 
bring the electoral count to a timely completion under the terms of the statute, 
even though it meant acquiescing in Hayes’s victory.81 
 
79. Id. 
80. Figure from Oberlin College Archives (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
81. See EVANS, supra note 21, at 307 (“Certainly concern for his own political future and that 
of the Democratic party were important considerations in all of Randall’s activities.”); see also House, 
supra note 19, at 98 (suggesting that Randall may also have been motivated by personal considerations, 
although crediting that Randall’s “actions at the time of the final crisis were the largest factors in the 
successful completion of the count”). 
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But this alternative account of Randall’s conduct on March 1 is ultimately 
unpersuasive. The best evidence indicates that if he had permitted the vote to take 
place, a majority of his party would have voted in favor of the hardline position 
(even if a majority of the whole House would have rejected it). Thus, it is fair to 
say that, in refusing to let the vote occur, Randall most likely was acting against the 
wishes of the majority of his own caucus.82 But even if this were not true—in 
other words, even if the hardliners most likely were a minority among Democrats 
at the crucial moment when they demanded a vote on their proposal—the most 
partisan thing to do would be simply to let them have their vote and see what the 
result was. Randall could have taken the position that, as Speaker, he would do 
whatever the majority of his own party wanted and the best way to find that out 
would be to hold the vote that the hardliners wanted. If they lost, so be it; but by 
letting the vote take place, he could not have been accused of thwarting the wishes 
of his own party. Yet thwarting those wishes was precisely what Randall was 
willing to do if and when it was necessary to act in accordance with what he 
perceived to be his duty under the electoral count statute.83 
Moreover, within the Democratic Party itself, Randall had been viewed as 
one of the hardliners. Well into the month of February, Randall himself was 
pronouncing his commitment “to fight on this Electoral Commission inch by 
inch, and defeat the count at all hazards.”84 For this reason, it was a great shock to 
the hardliners that he would not even let the House vote on their position. They 
considered Randall’s refusal a betrayal of what had been their common cause.85 
 
82. This point is true even if at other times during the whole Hayes-Tilden saga the hardline 
position reflected only a minority within the Democratic caucus. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
relative strength of the hardline position as events unfolded, based on the totality of roll call votes in 
the House, see MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, Southern Democrats in the Crisis of 1876–77: A Reconsideration of 
Reunion and Reaction, in PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 186, 186–209 (2006). 
83. Evans suggests that Randall was merely acting on “Tilden’s wishes” once Tilden finally 
signaled, in a telegram to Randall, that he (the party’s candidate) wanted the count complete. EVANS, 
supra note 21, at 307. But Randall did not receive Tilden’s telegram until sometime after midnight, as 
March 1 turned into March 2. Accord NEVINS, supra note 42, at 385; House, supra note 19, at 102; see 
ECKENRODE, supra note 47, at 230. Thus, hours earlier, when Randall made his crucial decision to 
deny the hardliners the vote they demanded, Randall did not have the benefit of the ever-vacillating 
Tilden’s final instructions—and hence Randall at that outcome-determinative moment was acting on 
his own, in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. 
84. Pomerantz, supra note 19, at 68 n.14 (quoting Randall’s letter to another Democrat). 
85. In general, Evans’s depiction of Randall does not take account of the critical timing of 
specific events on March 1 and does not mention Randall’s refusal to let the House vote on the key 
proposal of returning to the joint session without conducting the two-hour debate on Vermont. See 
EVANS, supra note 21, at 304. Thus, Evans offers no reasons to believe this specific decision by 
Randall was motivated by partisanship rather than a sense of obligation. House’s unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis on Randall mentions a rumor that on March 1 Randall was willing to bargain with Senate 
Republicans about who they would choose as their leader if he agreed to complete the count. House, 
supra note 19, at 101. But apart from the single New York Times story, which itself labeled the account 
as “Rumor,” The Electoral Count, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1878, House cites no other source to 
substantiate the allegation, and I have found no other work that mentions this innuendo. Evans also 
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Thus, no matter how one assesses the numerical strength of the hardliners 
on March 1, it is accurate to say that Randall resisted his own partisan impulses 
and instead was guided by what he believed “conscience and the law” required. In 
this respect, Randall acted virtuously, and he deserves to be praised for doing so.86 
A biographer of another Speaker of the House, Thomas Brackett Reed—
undoubtedly one of the most significant figures to hold that office—was 
especially effusive in his praise for Randall’s resistance of partisanship in order to 
avert the constitutional crisis that would have occurred if the election had not 
been settled by March 4: 
Randall . . . . possibly saved [the nation] from anarchy and civil war. . . . If 
Grant’s term had come to its constitutional end and his successor had not 
been determined upon, chaos itself would have intervened. The extent of 
the damage would have been incalculable with a weak or small man in the 
Speaker’s chair, and Randall reached a sublime height on that day when 
he put before himself the good of the country and, partisan as he usually 
was, and in defiance of many in his own party and of the precedents 
which he himself had helped to establish, he cleared the way for the 
completion of the count.87 
The bottom line is that Randall saw the hardliners of his own party as being 
willing to take the nation all the way to the edge of the constitutional cliff, and he 
took it upon himself as Speaker to keep the nation from reaching that edge. 
 
quotes a letter that Randall wrote some months later, in which he said he would have been “ruined 
and disgraced” and the Democratic party would have “disintegrat[ed]” if he had not insisted upon 
completing the count. EVANS, supra note 21, at 306 (quoting letter). But the letter also says the crisis 
that would have ensued would have caused “an end of liberty in the Country & a succession of 
military elections.” Id. Thus, Randall felt an overriding need to avoid this national calamity, of which 
his own downfall and that of his party would have been incidental byproducts. Consequently, 
Randall’s larger purpose as expressed in this letter is consistent with a sense of duty to nation above 
all else. In any event, in preparing this keynote address, I have not yet had an opportunity to examine 
Randall’s collected papers in Philadelphia, and thus a more definitive assessment of his conduct on 
March 1 must await that research. 
86. A history of House speakers, written at the end of the nineteenth century, observed that it 
would have been easy for Randall to let “the obstructionists” have their way and thus “to secure 
Hayes’s defeat,” but instead “Randall considered it his duty to obey the Electoral Commission act . . . 
and to stop obstruction on the Presidential election. He conscientiously performed this duty, 
therefore, in spite of his individual preferences and the fierce assault of his political friends.” M. P. 
FOLLETT, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 111 (Longmans, Green & Co. 
1896); see also ECKENRODE, supra note 47, at 228–29 (“If the Democratic Speaker Randall had sided 
with the protesting faction, the count of the Vermont vote might have been held up indefinitely, 
precipitating the interregnum. Randall, however . . . resolutely faced the mob of protesting, 
reproachful fellow-Democrats and finally put down the revolt.”). 
87. SAMUEL WALKER MCCALL, THE LIFE OF THOMAS BRACKETT REED 119 (1914) 
(echoing Reed’s own praise of Randall’s iron will and unfaltering courage); see also DE ALVA 
STANDWOOD ALEXANDER, HISTORY AND PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 44 
(1916) (stating that “by firm fairness” Randall “rose to exalted heights” in 1877); GEORGE 
ROTHWELL BROWN, THE LEADERSHIP OF CONGRESS 78–79 (1922) (expressing that Randall’s “bold 
use of the enormous powers of the speakership . . . . saved the situation”). 
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Moreover, it is undeniable that Randall acted courageously when the full force of 
the hardliners’ fury was leveled against him and he was threatened with physical 
attack—at least from Beebe, who was bounding towards him. 
Given these facts, I hope you can see why I consider Randall’s conduct on 
March 1 to be worthy of being called a “profile in electoral courage.” 
III. THE LESSONS OF RANDALL’S ELECTORAL HEROISM 
What use can we, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, make of 
Samuel Randall’s heroic moment of civic virtue and courage, which occurred more 
than six score years ago? I think there are at least three valuable lessons for us to 
draw. 
The first is actually a point about institutional reform. As heroic as Randall 
was in pulling the nation back from the constitutional precipice, the United States 
should not have to depend on such heroism in this kind of situation—especially 
not from a politician holding such an intrinsically partisan office as Speaker of the 
House. Instead, the issue of whether the federal government has received one or 
more timely certificates of electoral votes from a state, along with the ultimate 
question of whether or not a presidential candidate has won a majority of electoral 
votes, should be placed in the hands of a well-designed nonpartisan tribunal.88  
Second, we can only hope that the current Speaker of the House would 
exercise the same civic virtue if he happens to find himself in a similar situation. 
Suppose that in January of 2017—when Congress convenes to count the electoral 
votes from the 2016 presidential election—there develops a dispute over whether 
Wisconsin is a one- or two-certificate state.89 Imagine, for example, that there is a 
last-minute decision from the Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidating some ballots 
as improper under state law, and this ruling—which would be the basis for the 
purported second certificate—gives the state to the Republican candidate, whereas 
the Democrat wins the state in the absence of this last-minute ruling (and thus the 
first certificate awards the state to the Democrat). Under the Electoral Count Act 
of 1887, passed in the wake of the Hayes-Tilden dispute, and which remains in 
 
88. I have attempted to sketch the outlines of such an institution. See Foley, supra note 1, at 
508–09. 
89. The hypothetical scenario described in this paragraph of the keynote’s text, when 
delivered at the symposium on September 14, 2012, was drafted in terms of the then-upcoming 2012 
election. It has since been revised to refer to the 2016 presidential election, as the same point remains. 
Indeed, as long as the procedure for counting electoral votes is governed by the same rules as were in 
place in 2012, including the problematic Twelfth Amendment itself, there remains the risk that the 
outcome of the election depends on how the Speaker of the House decides to act. (To make the 
hypothetical work for the 2016 election, it is necessary to assume that in January 2017 Democrats 
control the Senate, Republicans control the House, and Wisconsin’s governor is a Republican—all of 
which were true for the 2012 election. If it helps to visualize the hypothetical scenario in one’s mind, 
then picture Hillary Clinton as the Democratic candidate and Marco Rubio as the Republican; but the 
hypothetical works just as well whoever ends up the two nominees.) 
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force, it still matters whether a state sends one or more certificates, and the 
president of the Senate still has the authority to make this ruling in the joint 
session.90 Therefore, imagine Vice President Joe Biden (who still will be president 
of the Senate of January 6, 2017, when Congress convenes under the Electoral 
Count Act) ruling that Wisconsin is a one-certificate state, which would assure the 
Democrat’s election,91 while hardline Republicans in the House insist that 
Wisconsin is a two-certificate state, which under the convoluted terms of the 
Electoral Count Act would lead to the Republican’s victory.92 Suppose Biden 
refuses to accept the second certificate as timely, while the hardline Republicans in 
the House insist that Biden must, or else the count remains incomplete, and thus 
the House will assert its constitutional prerogative under the Twelfth Amendment 
to elect the Republican directly in the absence of an electoral vote majority for 
either candidate. 
In other words, suppose the House Republicans in 2017 make the same 
constitutional argument that the House Democrats did in 1877, prepared to go all 
the way to constitutional brink to prevail. Would Speaker John Boehner (assuming 
he still is Speaker in 2017) resist the hardliners in his party in the same way that 
Speaker Randall did? In other words, would the current Speaker accept the 
authority of the president of the Senate to decide definitively whether there are 
one or more timely certificates from a state, and thus refuse to permit the House 
as a chamber to derail the completion of the count? We can certainly imagine 
hardliners within the current Republican Party—the so-called “Tea Party” 
types—being as intransigent as the hardline Democrats were on March 1, 1877. 
Thus, it is conceivable that resisting the hardline wing of his own party would 
 
90. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). This section, notoriously convoluted and difficult to compre-
hend, repeats the language of the 1877 statute that “all the certificates, and papers purporting to be 
certificates, of electoral votes” “shall be handed, as they are opened by the President of the Senate” to 
the tellers appointed by the House and Senate for this purpose. Id. This language does not definitively 
determine when a certificate is too late in arrival to be opened by the president of the Senate. 
91. This hypothetical scenario assumes that whichever presidential candidate wins Wisconsin 
will reach the 270 electoral votes necessary for being elected president without the involvement of the 
special procedure of the House of Representatives under the Twelfth Amendment. 
92. If Wisconsin is deemed a two-certificate state, then under 3 U.S.C. § 15, if the Senate and 
House disagree on which certificate to count—which presumably would be the case, with the Senate 
supporting the pro-Democrat certificate (assuming the Democrats still control the Senate in 2017) 
and the House favoring the pro-Republican certificate—then the certificate endorsed by Wisconsin’s 
governor is supposedly the tiebreaker, and presumably Wisconsin’s Republican governor would favor 
the late-arriving certificate that purports to give the state’s electoral votes to the Republican 
presidential candidate. Of course, given the extraordinary difficulty of interpreting 3 U.S.C. § 15, and 
its inherent ambiguities, Democrats in the Senate would argue that the Democratic presidential 
candidate should win even if Wisconsin is a two-certificate state. But who would adjudicate that 
dispute if Republicans in the House insist that their interpretation of 3 U.S.C. § 15 is the correct one? 
The point then is that as long as it is possible to assert that Wisconsin is a two-certificate state, and it 
is also possible to claim that the Republican candidate wins if Wisconsin is a two-certificate state, then 
the threat of a constitutional crisis exists where both sides claim entitlement to the presidency on 
Inauguration Day. 
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require Speaker Boehner to summon the same degree of fortitude and virtue that 
Randall was able to muster back then. Would the current Speaker match Randall 
in this respect? I leave that question for you to ponder, recognizing of course that 
in all likelihood it must remain in the realm of speculation. 
The third and final point I want to make is that the story of Randall’s 
heroism should be much better known than it is. It should feature prominently in 
high school history or civics classes, along with other “profiles in electoral 
courage”—like John Jay’s refusal as New York’s governor in 1800 to go along 
with Alexander Hamilton’s partisan plan to amend New York’s laws, in an effort 
to prevent Jefferson from becoming president.93 Moreover, these and other 
“profiles in electoral courage” should be emphasized not only in high school but 
also in the various educational sessions that we as academics hold for professional 
politicians. When we are invited to speak to the National Association of 
Secretaries of State, for example, or the National Conference of State Legislatures, 
we should consider whether it would be appropriate to remind our audiences of 
the historical examples in which our public officials put aside partisanship when 
making a major decision about the operation of the electoral process.94 In 
addition, if one or more of our current politicians resists partisan pressure in 
administering the electoral process, as Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted 
arguably has on occasion, we should praise that kind of electoral virtue.95 
 
 
93. For an account of Jay’s nonpartisan virtue in this electoral context, see Edward B. Foley, 
The Founders’ Bush v. Gore: The 1792 Election Dispute and Its Continuing Relevance, 44 IND. L. REV. 23, 77 
(2010). 
94. In addition to Randall and Jay, other examples at the state level would include Edward 
Everett’s decision in 1839 as the incumbent governor of Massachusetts not to contest his defeat, by a 
single vote, in his reelection bid; and Joshua Chamberlain’s role in mediating the intensely disputed 
gubernatorial election of 1879 in Maine. There is, too, the performance of the intentionally neutral 
three-judge panel chosen to adjudicate Minnesota’s disputed gubernatorial election of 1962, as well as 
the somewhat similar judicial panel selected to adjudicate Minnesota’s 2008 senatorial election. Also 
worthy of mention is John Quincy Adams’ essential role in ending the otherwise seemingly intractable 
dispute over the Speakership of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1839, which was tied up in a 
fight over ballots for representatives from New Jersey. All of these examples I discuss in a book I am 
writing, EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (forthcoming). Incidentally, for an entirely different episode in his long political 
career, John Quincy Adams is the first example of senatorial virtue in Kennedy’s Profiles in Courage. See 
KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 29–50. 
95. See Foley, supra note 6 (mentioning Husted’s refusal to appeal the “right church, wrong 
pew” ruling against him and, in doing so, resisting the more partisan position of his fellow 
Republican, Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine). Husted also fought his fellow Republicans in 
Ohio over the issue of voter identification, rejecting their calls for a stricter law as unnecessary and 
contrary to the interest of the public as a whole. And on the issue of redistricting, Husted previously 
was out front on the need for a bipartisan compromise to avoid the egregious gerrymanders that 
plague Ohio politics. 
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Figure 12: John Jay 
We should teach these “profiles in electoral courage” so that they become 
admired and, hopefully, emulated. I am not so naïve to think that proselytizing 
about electoral virtue in this way will automatically cause our politicians to 
suddenly become electoral heroes, resisting partisan pressures in the mold of 
Samuel Randall. But what we teach about U.S. history, both in high school and to 
professional politicians, does have the capacity to affect our political culture, at 
least over time and to some extent. Because we inevitably must rely to some 
degree on our politicians to be virtuous if the governance of the electoral process 
is to be free from partisan favoritism, we must hope that we can begin to cultivate 
at least modest improvements in the propensity of politicians to act with electoral 
virtue.96 
Moreover, if we do it right, teaching a set of “profiles in electoral courage” 
has the capacity to yield vivid lifelong memories of the standard to which we 
should hold our politicians when they make major decisions about the operation 
of the electoral process. These “profiles in electoral courage” are suitable for role-
playing exercises, with participants asking themselves what they would have done 
if they had been in the same situation as Samuel Randall, or John Jay, or another 
 
96. Justin Levitt has written a timely, important, and sophisticated paper on the use of 
situational norms to constrain the temptations of officeholders to act based on partisan impulses. See 
Justin Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming). As Levitt cogently 
argues, the cultivation of these norms is, along with institutional design and sound substantive 
electoral rules, a necessary tool in an inevitably multipronged approach to increasing the possibility of 
impartiality in the governance of the electoral process. Id. As made clear in the introduction to this 
address, I share Levitt’s view that the adoption of nonpartisan institutions is also an essential 
ingredient to electoral reform (and I, too, believe that well-formulated substantive rules are a 
necessary, although not by themselves sufficient, component of improving the electoral process). 
Thus, in the same spirit as Levitt’s new paper, I hope that my highlighting of Randall’s role in the 
resolution of the disputed Hayes-Tilden election—as well as my broader call for a renewal of civics 
education that heralds other “profiles in electoral courage”—can help to inculcate among 
professional election officials the kind of role morality that Levitt analyzes and extols. 
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example of an electoral hero (like Charles Evans Hughes for his role in New York 
City’s disputed mayoral election of 1905).97 Having experienced vicariously in this 
way what it is like to stand in the shoes of a politician faced with this kind of 
decision and having the ability to refer to examples in the past where politicians 
acted virtuously in the moment of truth, the recipients of this form of education 
can demand that future politicians also do the right thing when they face their 
own moments of truth. 
In any event, what and how we teach is something we who are academics 
can control. We certainly have more control over our teaching than we do over 
the structure of the institutions that govern the electoral process. It is not as if our 
scholarly proposals for institutional reform have all been adopted just because we 
have advocated these reforms. Thus, without abandoning these efforts at 
institutional reform, we should also devote some serious and sustained scholarly 
attention to the cultivation of electoral virtue. We can do this directly, by 
considering the content of what we teach and how we teach it, both to our regular 
students in the classroom as well as to our wider audiences. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent decades, scholars have largely neglected the cultivation of civic 
virtue as a pedagogical goal. It is considered an old-fashioned, even quaint, ideal. 
But it is one to which we should return. If we do, over time we might discover 
that we actually can help make a difference in the quality of our civic culture and 
thus, in turn, also make a difference in the quality of our democratic government 
and the electoral process that enables it to operate. 
To that end, I have offered the story of Speaker Samuel Randall and his 
example of civic virtue, in the face of intense partisan pressure to do otherwise, at 




97. This example, too, will be discussed in the Ballot Battles book. See FOLEY, supra note 93. 
